Rights, Dignity, and Well-being: A Closer Look at Nowheresville

Defending and securing human rights is a difficult struggle, but one that many of us agree is worthwhile. We have seen arguments for these rights based on a variety of foundations, such as human sacredness (Perry, p. 11), action (Gewirth, p. 12) or dignity (Kohen, p. 9), yet all of these reasons support the end that “certain things ought not to be done to any human being and certain other things ought to be done for every human being” (Perry, p. 13). In contrast to this end, Joel Feinburg argues that the act of claiming a right gives human a certain dignity that cannot be accessed without a notion of rights. I contend that Feinberg is wrong in this notion, and, by drawing on Onuma Yasuaki, I show that rights are merely a means to an end, that of a certain type of well-being for mankind. Through this process, I hope to show that Feinberg’s Nowheresville is not nearly as bad as he contends.

Feinburg attempts to illustrate the necessity of rights for human dignity by constructing a fictional place which he entitles ‘Nowheresville’ (p. 143). In this state, there is no notion of rights, yet there are still many of the good things that rights provide for us. Men are sympathetic and benevolent, but only from compassionate motives. Additionally, duties exist in Nowheresville, though not because of any corresponding right of any particular individual (p. 143-144). Finally, Feinberg tacks on characteristics such as personal desert and a sovereign monopoly of rights in order to make Nowheresville even more functional and desirable (p. 145-148). Indeed, Nowheresville appears to be a wonderful utopia.

But appearances are deceiving, he warns. Because of the absence of rights, people have no notion of a legitimate claim to something (Feinberg, p. 148). Rights are meant to be ‘claimed, demanded, and affirmed,’ and without the ability to make these sorts of claims, man is without dignity (Feinberg, p. 151). To Feinberg, it is rights that allow men to be ‘properly proud, to have that minimal self-respect that is necessary to be worthy of the love and esteem of others’ (p. 151). This apparent utopia has been shown to be a farce, a place full of utility but lacking in self-worth.

To me, this view is wrong-headed. Rights are not asserted to claim dignity, but rather to promote a certain type of life. Onuma Yasuaki has addressed this as he claims that rights are but one means of achieving the ultimate end: the spiritual and material well-being of humanity (p. 1). Yasuaki does not expand on this well-being, but it surely focuses on safety and security of person without oppression from others. This well-being is difficult to obtain due to the malevolent nature of mankind. Proof of this evil is hardly necessary; one need simply to peruse the history books or to watch the evening news to observe the senseless violence and disregard for the Other that is endemic to human beings. No other animal has invented as many ways to be cruel as we have, and our potential remains unlimited.

Fortunately, Western Enlightenment thinkers discovered a rather useful way to promote the widespread well-being that is a universal yearning of mankind. The idea of human rights as an individual claim against others, especially one’s government, have accounted for giant leaps in well-being in recent centuries. Yasuaki claims these rights often use a distinctly individual language due to the political dysfunction from which they arose (p. 8). In fact, the idea of rights could not have arisen from any other place but one that was individualistic and legalistic (Yasuaki, p. 9). These rights have been expanded to other countries precisely because it is the most effective method we currently have to promote the general well-being (Yasuaki, p. 9). Assuredly, rights have their own problems to deal with, including the criticism by Mary Ann Glendon that individualistic rights talk can lead to less focus on corresponding duties, but there will always be trade-offs (Glendon, p. 14). The important thing is to recognize the utility that rights give us in achieving our ultimate goals, while also understanding that rights may not be the most effective way in the future.

In sum, Feinberg fails to convince me of what is so bad about Nowheresville. A state that functions wonderfully and justly without a need for distinct rights sounds more conducive to the spiritual and material well-being that we all seek and, as such, seems preferable to our current state of affairs. If we could somehow educate everyone to act benevolently and to obey moral duties, rights would become a forgotten relic of an unfortunate time. I am unconvinced about the potential for mankind to achieve this type of benevolence so, at this time, rights will have to do. Not because I need to claim them in order to respect myself, but because they are currently the most effective means to the most desirable end.

Questions:

1: Are rights necessary for dignity?

2: Would you live in Nowheresville? Is a benevolent world without rights preferable to an evil world with rights?

Alex DeBrie